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Abstract 
Opinion polls remain among the most efficient and widespread methods to capture psycho-social 
data at large scales. However, there are limitations on the logistics and structure of opinion polls that 
restrict the amount and type of information that can be collected. As a consequence, data from 
opinion polls are often reported in simple percentages and analyzed non-parametrically. In this 
paper, response data on just four questions from a national opinion poll were used to demonstrate 
that a parametric scale can be constructed using item response modeling approaches. Developing a 
parametric scale yields interval-level measures which are more useful than the strictly ordinal-level 
measures obtained from Likert-type scales common in opinion polls. The metric that was developed 
in this paper, a measure of religious morality, can be processed and used in a wider range of statistical 
analyses compared to conventional approaches of simply reporting percentages at item-level. Finally, 
this paper reports the item parameters so that researchers can adopt these items to future 
instruments and place their own results on the same scale, thereby allowing responses from future 
samples to be compared to the results from the representative data in this paper. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Challenges in public opinion polls 
Opinion polls are one of the main sources of information for the general public and for various 
stakeholders across a wide range of fields but more prominently in politics, economics, marketing 
and social advocacy (e.g., surveys on loneliness, happiness, well-being). Opinion polls are among the 
most efficient methods to gather mass data on psycho-social constructs1. Compared to formal 
assessments, psychological evaluations, and standardized tests, opinion polls are faster and cheaper. 
These advantages, however, are countered by the low response rates of opinion polls, especially for 
telephone surveys. The response rates of telephone surveys can be as low as 9% and online polls, 
while more utilized as a method, have even lower response rates (Keeter, Hatley, Kennedy, & Lau, 
2017). Even high-effort methods, such as in-person surveys and those that include monetary 
incentives or longer field periods, the response rates have also been declining over the years and 
more recently stands at around 22% (Keeter, Kennedy, Dimock, Best, & Craighill, 2006). Although 
low response rates are not an indicator of quality and can produce comparable results as high-
response methods, the low response rates have implications for costs as more people would need to 
be contacted to obtain a target sample size (Keeter et al., 2006). The nature of opinion polls also 
restricts the amount and type of information that can be collected. No one wants to go through a two-
hour telephone survey and, by its nature, all responses to an opinion poll are essentially self-reports. 
The main challenge given these constraints is how to extract more reliable information from even 
very restricted opinion poll data. 
This paper discusses the validity and interpretability issues in the traditional/conventional 
approaches to dealing with categorical response data, while also demonstrating the potential of 
                                                          
1 In psychological terminology, “constructs” are concepts that have meanings “constructed” from theory rather 
than from empirical sources. That is, unlike empirical entities with tangible and measurable properties, constructs 
have no inherent meaning independent of their theoretical conceptualization. 
modern measurement approaches to address these issues and challenges. The main purpose of this 
paper is to compare conventional vs modern measurement approaches to develop useful metrics 
based on very limited survey responses. These metrics are essential if we need to analyze the results 
in more comprehensive manner because it will allow for more sophisticated quantitative methods to 
be applied to interval-level metrics than to the original categorical responses. 
For the purposes of this paper, we are using a national telephone survey on political issues to 
demonstrate that we can extract a limited subset of the response data to develop a metric on 
"religious morality". Large-scale national opinion polls commonly gather information on multiple 
issues and therefore there is potential to extract data on various psycho-social constructs. However, 
these subsets of any particular opinion poll (which is itself limited in scope) are very limited, and 
hence the need to implement methods to maximize the amount of information that we can extract 
and process. 
1.2 Conventional approaches 
The most common approach in reporting categorical response data is through frequency counts, for 
example as shown in Table 1. A related approach is to report percentages, which is popular in the 
media. We often hear of reporters saying that, “X% of people disapproves of this particular person or 
policy”. There is nothing wrong with this usage of opinion data, but it is very limited and specific to a 
particular survey question. This means that we cannot infer beyond what information is available in 
the proportions of responses to a category, nor can we compare the numbers across the survey 
questions (i.e., a 40% agreement on a question is not interpretable in the same way as a 40% 
agreement on another question). 
Conventional options for analytical approaches are rather limited to non-parametric statistical 
analysis in the strict sense. However, it is not uncommon for researchers to treat Likert-type 
categorical responses as if these are on an interval scale and apply parametric analysis on the data. 
Treating ordered categorical data as an interval measure rest on the assumption that the distance 
between adjacent categories are uniform (e.g., the difference between “strongly agree” and “agree” is 
quantitatively the same as between “disagree” and “strongly disagree”), which in turn requires that 
the qualitatively described categories mean the same for different people endorsing them, and 
assumption that has long been under contention (see Cronbach, 1946; Jones & Thurstone, 1955).  
Likert (1932) himself considered the summation of item scores (i.e., total of the coded responses) as 
a scale, although he did not consider the item-level codes themselves as a scale. Likert’s position adds 
to the confusion because it is mathematically unclear as to how codes that are not considered scales 
can sum up to a scale. Nevertheless, the popularity of Likert-type scales is undeniable, and the use of 
summated scores and treating them as an interval scale is ubiquitous across the social sciences 
(Cummins, 1997). This is a controversial issue and the debate as to the extent that the assumption of 
an interval scale is defensible continues.  
Party affiliation Q40c: Do you personally believe that having an abortion is 
morally acceptable, morally wrong, or is it not a moral issue? 
Depends on 
situation 
Don't 
know/Refused 
Morally 
acceptable 
Morally 
wrong 
Not a 
moral 
issue 
Democrat 51 18 90 162 157 
Independent 39 21 65 226 155 
No preference 7 4 6 19 4 
Other party 4 3 5 8 6 
Republican 28 16 34 298 68 
Table 1 
1.3 Item response modelling approaches 
Item response modeling (IRM) is part of a family of factor analytic approaches towards measurement 
of latent traits based on item response theory (IRT) of measurement2. Under this approach, these 
item response models yield interval-level measures which are more useful than the strictly ordinal-
level measures obtained from Likert-type scales (Goldstein & Hersen, 1984). The IRM approach 
involves models that have a wide range of complexity, ranging from models that are designed for 
dichotomous responses (e.g., 0-1, yes-no) to those that handle multiple categories and types of 
responses. Taking into account that responses to Likert-type questions are not in a true interval scale, 
we used item response models that are designed for categorical responses. Three item response 
models were used in this paper, each have different design parameters which will be discussed in 
detail in the Methods section.  
2 Methods 
2.1 Data 
The dataset3 came from the February 2012 political survey conducted by the Pew Research Center 
(2012). This dataset contains a national sample of N=1501 respondents (all adults and living in 50 
US states and the District of Columbia) to telephone interviews conducted using random digit dialing 
(for more details on the survey methods, see Pew Research Center, 2018). Four of the survey 
questions were used for this paper, described in Table 2. To make the ordered categories uniform 
across the “morality” and the “religiousness” questions, the response categories were reordered such 
that larger values are interpreted consistently across these two main scale components. While this is 
                                                          
2 For a more comprehensive dive on this rich topic, Embretson & Reise (2013) and Wilson (2004) provide an 
excellent course on the fundamentals of IRT. 
3 This dataset can be downloaded at http://www.people-press.org/dataset/february-2012-political-survey/  
technically just an arbitrary ordering, we have included an item response model that does not take 
this a priori ordering into account to check if our assumptions are reasonable. 
Variable Question Response options Recoded ordered categories 
Q40a   Do you personally believe that 
using contraceptives is morally 
acceptable, morally wrong, or is it 
not a moral issue? 
1 Morally acceptable 
2 Morally wrong 
3 Not a moral issue 
4 Depend on situation  
9 Don’t know/Refused  
 
1 Morally acceptable 
2 Not a moral issue  
3 Depend on situation 
4 Morally wrong  
NA Don’t know/Refused  
 
Q40b   Do you personally believe that 
getting a divorce is morally 
acceptable, morally wrong, or is it 
not a moral issue? 
Q40c   Do you personally believe that 
having an abortion is morally 
acceptable, morally wrong, or is it 
not a moral issue? 
ATTEND   Aside from weddings and 
funerals, how often do you 
attend religious services... 
more than once a week, 
once a week, once or twice 
a month, a few times a year, 
seldom, or never? 
 
1 More than once a 
week 
2 Once a week 
3 Once or twice a month 
4 A few times a year 
5 Seldom 
6 Never 
9 Don't know/Refused 
 
6 More than once a 
week 
5 Once a week 
4 Once or twice a month 
3 A few times a year 
2 Seldom 
1 Never 
NA Don't know/Refused 
 
Table 2 
Cases with non-response on all of the “morality” questions (Q40a to Q40c) were not included in this 
paper, yielding a final sample size of N=1494 for the analyses in this paper. Selected demographic 
variables from the dataset were used as grouping variables in the analyses. Table 3 reports the 
grouping variables and the categories within each group, as well as unweighted and weighted sample 
sizes based on the sampling weights provided in the dataset. The weighted sample size was used in 
computing the standard errors and the confidence intervals in the analyses. Additional details on the 
sampling methodology and the definitions of these demographics variables can be obtained from the 
original survey (Pew Research Center, 2012) and the Center’s published methodology references 
(Pew Research Center, 2018). 
Demographic Variables Unweighted N Weighted N 
Party affiliation 
 
 
Independent 506 1683.00 
Democrat 478 1480.46 
Republican 444 1220.54 
No preference 40 160.23 
Other 26 107.88 
Gender   
Female 907 2797.88 
Male 533 1564.08 
Missing data 54 290.15 
Race   
Black or African-American 626 1796.08 
White 550 1783.27 
Hispanic 144 425.54 
Some other race 96 276.15 
Asian or Asian-American 24 80.92 
Missing data 54 290.15 
Geographical area   
Suburban 681 2043.92 
Urban 454 1518.23 
Rural 284 786.31 
Missing data 75 303.65 
Region   
South 530 1665.00 
Midwest 368 1057.81 
West 365 1091.46 
Northeast 231 837.85 
Political views/ideology   
Moderate 542 1708.31 
Conservative 438 1270.88 
Liberal 241 763.65 
Very conservative 109 300.08 
Very liberal 93 334.92 
Don't know/Refused 71 274.27 
Family income    
Less than $10,000 100 452.35 
10 to under $20,000 142 507.77 
20 to under $30,000 174 635.58 
30 to under $40,000 147 456.42 
40 to under $50,000 140 396.08 
50 to under $75,000 199 570.50 
75 to under $100,000 157 457.42 
100 to under $150,000 165 430.42 
$150,000 or more 113 276.65 
Don't know/Refused 157 468.92 
Table 3 
2.2 Scaling and analysis 
2.2.1 Modeling the classical composite scale 
A common, if somewhat controversial, method used for analyzing ordered categorical data is simply 
using the mean of the composite score across the response data. In situations where the categories 
are not equally spaced, the responses can be standardized or converted into a z-score.  
We used two standardization approaches here for comparative purposes. The first is to standardize 
the composite score after it has been calculated. Because standardization is a linear transformation, 
it does not matter if the conversion is done on the raw total score or on the mean score. The mean z-
score in this approach is denoted as z_score.b. 
z_score.b =
𝑥𝑛 − 𝜇𝑁
𝜎𝑁
 
where xn is the composite score for person n, and µN σN represent the overall mean and standard 
deviation respectively. 
The second approach is to standardize each response first and then computing the average of the z-
scores across all Q items. The mean z-score in this approach is denoted as z_score.w. 
z_score.w =
∑
𝑥𝑛𝑖 − 𝜇𝑁𝑖
𝜎𝑁𝑖
𝑄
1
𝑄
 
where xni is the score for person n on item i, and µNi σNi represent the overall mean and standard 
deviation for all respondents on item i respectively. 
 
The difference between these two approaches is that the final mean scores in the first approach are 
comparatively more skewed towards the items with the largest category value. For example, if a 
questionnaire has 9 items with a 5-point scale, and one item with a 10-point scale, the totals and 
hence the means will be more heavily affected by the 10-point item. Whereas in the second approach, 
because all responses were standardized prior to aggregating, all items have the same contribution 
towards the aggregate score. 
2.2.2 Modeling the GRM scale 
Using a graded response model (GRM; Samejima, 1968), also known as the ordinal response model, 
the responses in the 4 questionnaire items were treated as ordered categories similar to a rating 
scale or Likert-type items. This means that the intervals between categories are not interpreted as 
numeric scores but rather as nominal categories that have a specific order. Under the GRM, for item 
i with m possible response categories coded as x the probability of a person n with latent ability θn 
responding with category x or greater is expressed below: 
𝑃𝑖𝑥
∗ (𝜃𝑛) = 𝑃(𝑋𝑖 ≥ 𝐶𝑥𝑖|𝜃𝑛) =
𝑒𝑎𝑖(𝜃𝑛−𝑑𝑖𝑥)
1 + 𝑒𝑎𝑖(𝜃𝑛−𝑑𝑖𝑥)
 
where ai and di represent the discrimination and difficulty parameters of item i respectively. In the 
context of subjective responses such as in opinion polls, the difficulty parameter can be interpreted 
as the location of the particular question statement on the opinion continuum (e.g., level of 
agreement). 
This is the cumulative category response function where the boundary of response probabilities is 
defined as follows: 
𝑃(𝑋𝑖 ≥ 𝐶1𝑖|𝜃𝑛) = 1, responding with the lowest category or greater 
𝑃(𝑋𝑖 ≥ 𝐶𝑚𝑖|𝜃𝑛) = 0, responding with the highest category or greater 
As such, the probability of a person responding exactly with a given category is: 
𝑃𝑖𝑥(𝜃𝑛) = 𝑃𝑖𝑥
∗ (𝜃𝑛) −  𝑃𝑖𝑥+1
∗ (𝜃𝑛) 
𝑃𝑖𝑥(𝜃𝑛) = 𝑃(𝑋𝑖 = 𝐶𝑥𝑖|𝜃𝑛) =
𝑒−𝑎𝑖(𝜃𝑛−𝑑𝑖𝑥+1) − 𝑒−𝑎𝑖(𝜃𝑛−𝑑𝑖𝑥)
[1 + 𝑒−𝑎𝑖(𝜃𝑛−𝑑𝑖𝑥)][1 + 𝑒−𝑎𝑖(𝜃𝑛−𝑑𝑖𝑥+1)]
 
2.2.3 Modeling the GGUM scale 
The generalized graded unfolding model (GGUM; Roberts, 2008) operates on the basis that subjective 
responses are not strictly cumulative even if they are ordered in nature. The concept behind the 
GGUM is that item responses unfold from the position that centers on an individual’s location on the 
scale (Roberts, Donoghue, & Laughlin, 2000). This model is more appropriate for Likert-type items 
where the item-format measures extent of agreement and there is no strict requirement for the 
graded categories to be cumulative (e.g., in GRM). Under this model, the responses can be ordered 
where the direction of the ordering is symmetric from a category that is indicative of one’s position 
on a continuum. For example, if someone responds “Agree” on a question, the person might be coming 
from both sides of the continuum and the response probabilities are equal from either side. In other 
words, the response probabilities “unfold” from one’s underlying position on the continuum where 
for every response category, an individual has two possible subjective response: “endorse the item 
from the left end of the continuum” or “endorse the item from the right end of the continuum”.  
If we denote C as the number of observable response categories minus one (i.e., excluding the actual 
observed response, or the person’s location on the continuum), the unfolding mechanism can be 
thought of as implying that there are two “subjective” responses on either side of the observed 
response. If we denote M as the number of “subjective” responses, then M = 2*C + 1. The responses 
can then be reparametrized as distance (z) from the person’s location, where z = 0, …, C, and C by 
definition above also represents the maximum level of agreement corresponding to the person’s 
location (the point where θn = di). The GGUM defines the probability of a person n with latent ability 
θn responding with z on item i as: 
𝑃(𝑍𝑖 = 𝑧|𝜃𝑛) =
𝑓(𝑧)−𝑓(𝑀−𝑧)
∑ [𝑓(𝑧)−𝑓(𝑀−𝑧)]𝐶𝑤=0
, such that  
𝑓(𝑤) = exp {𝑎𝑖 [𝑤(𝜃𝑛 − 𝑑𝑖𝑘) − ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑘
𝑤
𝑘=0
]} 
where ik represents the threshold parameter for the kth response category relative to the location 
of the ith item. This parameter is constrained to 0 at the neutral position, such that i(C+1) = 0. And 
because the probabilities for opposing categories are symmetric from the neutral position, iz  = 
i(Mz+1) for z  0. 
The main difference between the GRM and GGUM is that GRM is cumulative in the sense that an 
endorsement of a category implies endorsement of all categories that are ordered lower than it. 
Endorsement of a category under GGUM however is associated with a subjective position that could 
come from opposing poles with respect to the statement being endorsed. In a pure rating scale 
format, where the response indicates a level of agreement towards a statement, the GGUM might be 
more appropriate. However, the questions that were used for this study is a mix of rating and 
categorically ordered formats.  
2.2.4 Modeling the NRM scale  
The final model we include in this comparison does not constrain the response categories with an a 
priori ordering. Although from the layperson’s perspective it would be reasonable to interpret the 
categories as ordered, it is not strict requirement and models that do not have this constraint is useful 
to test whether the a priori ordering set by the questionnaire developer is valid in the first place. For 
example, although we recoded a response of “Not a moral issue” as lower on the scale compared to 
“Depend on situation”, this interpretation might not be universal.  
For comparative purposes, we included an item response model that does not have a prior 
assumption of rank order among the categorical response. In the nominal response model (NRM; 
Bock, 1972), the probability of a person n with latent ability θn responding with category k on item i 
is given as: 
𝑃(𝑋𝑖 = 𝑘𝑖|𝜃𝑛) =
𝑒𝑎𝑖𝑘(𝜃𝑛−𝑑𝑖𝑘)
∑ 𝑒𝑎𝑖𝑘(𝜃𝑛−𝑑𝑖ℎ)𝑚ℎ=1
 
where ki represents the kth option, k ε [1,2, …,m] out of m options. Similar to the GRM, aik and dik 
represent the discrimination and difficulty parameters of item i respectively for each category k. 
2.2.5 Locating individual position on the scale 
All item response models were fitted to the data using the mirt package (Chalmers, 2012), where the 
item parameters were estimated using an expectation-maximization algorithm (Bock & Aitkin, 
1981). Once the item parameters were estimated, point estimates of the respondents’ location on the 
measurement scale are computed. This person parameter (θn) is based on the likelihood of the 
person’s response vector given the item parameters, and estimated using either maximum likelihood 
or Bayesian estimators. The latter type, specifically the modal a posteriori (MAP) estimator, was used 
in this paper to locate the respondents on the respective scales. MAP estimation is described more 
fully by Embretson and Reise (2013). Estimating θn is as follows: 
𝜃𝑛 = 𝑌(𝜃𝑛|ξ,U𝑛) 
where Y is the expected θ given  as the matrix of item parameters (e.g., ai, di) and Un as the vector of 
responses (U1n, U2n, … Uin) to each item (1,2,… i) by person n. 
The resulting scales for both z-scores and MAP estimates have the same metric characteristics (M=0, 
SD=1) so they are broadly comparable. The scales are centered at 0, which means that the overall 
average “religious morality” scale score is 0, and higher values indicate stronger religious morality. 
The scale is probabilistic, as opposed to a physical scale where values represent real magnitudes, 
which means that the values indicate relative probabilities. The units of the scale are in logits (log of 
the odds). To illustrate this scale, Figure 1 shows the location of four individuals along a continuum, 
a scale of some construct (e.g., "morality"). Because the construct itself is not physical, the scale is 
arbitrary in nature and can only show relative relationships (i.e., relative to the center of the scale). 
In this case, the values indicate associations to the scale relative to someone with a scale score of 0, 
with odds defined as: 𝑂MAP =
𝑝
1−𝑝
. As such, Person A has an odds of 0.082 [OMAP = .07586/(1-.07586)] 
being associated with the construct relative to the scale center, while Person D has an odds of 33.115. 
The characteristic of an interval-level scale means than two individuals with MAP estimates that 
differ by X will have the same relative probability of being associated with a location on the scale, or 
the same odds-ratio (OR) no matter where they are on the scale. That is, the OR will be the same 
between Person A(MAP=-2.5) vs Person B(MAP=-1) as between Person C(MAP=2) vs Person 
D(MAP=3.5). The logs of these differences will also be the same, log(.22)=-1.5, which reflect the same 
differences between the pairs A-B and C-D. 
𝑂𝑅(𝐴/𝐵) =
𝑂MAP(A)
𝑂MAP(B)
=
𝑝𝐴
1 − 𝑝𝐴
𝑝𝐵
1 − 𝑝𝐵
=
0.082
0.368
= 0.22 
𝑂𝑅(𝐶/𝐷) =
𝑂MAP(C)
𝑂MAP(D)
=
𝑝𝐶
1 − 𝑝𝐶
𝑝𝐷
1 − 𝑝𝐷
=
7.389
33.115
= 0.22 
  
Figure 1 
 
Finally, summary statistics were computed for the subgroups that were chosen previously. All 
analyses were conducted within the R environment (CRAN, 2017). 
3 Results 
3.1 Comparison between the different standardization methods in the classical 
approach 
As previously discussed, z-score.b estimate is more skewed towards the items with the largest 
category value compared to the z-score.w estimate. In this instance, the “religiosity” question has 
more impact on the aggregate score because its code ranges from 1 to 6 whereas the rest of the 
questions are on a 1-4 range. Checking whether this effect is statistically significant, we can see that 
using the z-score.b estimate produces a statistically significantly different mean score for some 
subgroups. Figure 2 shows that the mean scale score for Republicans is overestimated compared to 
the mean scale score using z-score.w estimates. This overestimate is statistically significant at a 
confidence level of 95%. The effect is even more pronounced in the mean scale scores across 
subgroups based on political ideology (Figure 3), where statistically significant biases are observed 
for the mean scale scores of 4 out of 6 subgroups. More importantly, this bias affects the inferences 
we make. Figure 3 shows that if z-score.b estimate is used, it would support the inference that the 
very liberal group have a statistically lower average religious morality scale score than the liberal 
group, an inference that would not be supported if the z-score.w estimate is used. 
 
Figure 2 
 Figure 3 
Notwithstanding the controversy around the use of averages in Likert-type scales, this comparison 
of the estimates from the naïve approach shows that standardizing at item level prior to computing 
the summated scale (and thereafter the average for such scale) is perhaps the lesser evil. The caveat 
in these comparisons, however, is that if the assumption fails that Likert-type scales can be treated 
as interval scales, then these comparisons will not be mathematically defensible because the 
standard errors (which are the bases for the confidence intervals) will not be interpretable. 
3.2 Comparison between the various IRM-based scales 
In contrast to the naïve approach in dealing with categorical scores, the IRM-based scales are proper 
interval scales and therefore the distances are uniform. The latent estimates are probabilistically 
derived and the computation of standard errors is mathematically defensible. The latent estimates 
are dependent on the particular item response model that is used to obtain them, but the scales have 
the same characteristics and are comparable with each other. Because the scales are interval 
measures, the averages for any group or subgroup are also comparable to other groups. For example, 
the average scores by party affiliation (Figure 4) can be compared directly with the average scores 
by political view (Figure 5) or by geographic region (Figure 6).  
If we need to compare the models, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) can be used where lower values are interpreted as better fitting models (Raftery, 
1995). Table 4 shows that the NRM is more preferable, although the estimates from each of the three 
models are in close agreement and often do not have statistically significant differences from each 
other. The only notable difference is in the estimates for the Independent (see Figure 4) and Moderate 
(see Figure 5) subgroups, where the average scale score based on the GGUM estimate is significantly 
different from the other two models. 
Model Model AIC Model BIC 
GRM 14527.03 14622.60 
GGUM 17211.51 17328.32 
NRM 14199.43 14348.09 
Table 4 
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3.3 Effect of recoding the categories among the IRM approach 
Here we check the effects of alternate codings of the categories. As previously discussed, there are 
situations where the order of the categories might be more subjective. For instance, although the 
order for ATTEND is straightforward, the order between “Not a moral issue” and “Depend on 
situation” is open to interpretation.  
Another potential coding change is due to fact that codes do not represent magnitude and therefore 
the gaps between any two codes are not strictly interpretable as true difference. For example, a 
category that has been coded as 2 is not 2 units away from a category that has been coded as 4. 
Similarly, the distance between category 1 and 2 cannot be interpreted as mathematically equal to 
the distance between category 2 and 3. 
To compare the effect of revising the order of the response categories, the analyses were conducted 
on an alternate dataset with the revised codings as shown in Table 5, with changes bolded for 
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emphasis. The “morality” questions were recoded such that ordering was changed, whereas the 
“religiosity” question was revised such that the distance between some categories was changed. 
Original ordering Revised ordering 
1 Morally acceptable 
2 Not a moral issue  
3 Depend on situation 
4 Morally wrong  
NA Don’t know/Refused  
 
1 Not a moral issue  
2 Morally acceptable 
3 Depend on situation 
4 Morally wrong  
NA Don’t know/Refused  
 
6 More than once a week 
5 Once a week 
4 Once or twice a month 
3 A few times a year 
2 Seldom 
1 Never 
NA Don't know/Refused 
7 More than once a week 
6 Once a week 
4 Once or twice a month 
3 A few times a year 
2 Seldom 
0 Never 
NA Don't know/Refused 
Table 5 
To check whether or not the models changed when the response category codes were changed, model 
fit metrics were compared. Both AIC and BIC were used and the magnitude of the difference was 
interpreted using conventions in the literature that differences greater than 10 (i.e., AIC/BIC > 10) 
indicates strong support that the compared models are in fact different (Burnham & Anderson, 2003; 
Raftery, 1995). Results show that both GRM and GGUM models are affected by the change in coding. 
As expected, the NRM model is not affected at all, with the model fit metrics remaining essentially 
identical between the original and alternate models (Table 6). 
Model Original model 
AIC 
Alternate model 
AIC 
AIC Original 
model 
BIC 
Alternate 
model 
BIC 
BIC 
GRM 14527.03 14246.36 280.67 14622.6 14341.92 280.68 
GGUM 17211.51 14474.68 2736.83 17328.32 14591.49 2736.83 
NRM 14199.43 14199.37 0.06 14348.09 14348.03 0.06 
Table 6 
The robustness of the NRM in comparison with the other two models is illustrated in the change in 
group averages based on the original and alternate coding schemes. Figures 6 through 8 show the 
effect of recoding on the average scale scores of subgroups by party across the three models. There 
are observed statistically significant differences in several of the subgroups for both GRM and GGUM. 
These differences have inferential consequences for the subgroups that are affected because the 
recoding resulted in average scale scores that are now statistically significantly different from the 
overall mean (see for example, Other party in Figure 7 and Independent in Figure 8). It is notable that 
for NRM, the recoding has no effect at all (Figure 9). 
 
Figure 7 
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Figure 9 
Notwithstanding that the NRM is robust to coding changes, the model fit metrics reported in Table 6 
suggest that the alternate recoding results in models that are better fitting (lower AIC and BIC 
values). To enable future researchers to adapt the items in this paper to their instruments, and to 
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allow the results from those to be set on the same scale as what was reported here, the item 
parameters for the NRM (based on the alternate recoding, Table 5) is reported in Table 7. 
Item aik dik 
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 k=6 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 k=6 
Q40a -
1.285 
-
0.519 
0.196 1.608 
  
1.605 1.602 -
1.459 
-
1.748 
  
Q40B -
1.178 
-
0.325 
0.696 0.806 
  
1.078 0.492 -
1.315 
-
0.255 
  
Q40C -
5.328 
0.557 1.547 3.224 
  
-
2.355 
0.66 0.279 1.416 
  
ATTEND -
0.659 
-
0.623 
-
0.391 
-
0.007 
0.549 1.132 -
0.268 
-
0.017 
0.126 0.103 0.527 -
0.471 
Table 7 
4 Discussion 
The results show that meaningful measurement scales can be developed from very constrained 
opinion poll data. Utilizing IRM-based approaches can yield measures that are stable under 
categorical coding changes. More importantly, these measures are interval-level and are thus can be 
analyzed parametrically. The amount of information that we can extract for inferences on population 
subgroups is quite substantial given that the data come from only 4 questions obtained through 
telephone survey. The results based on the NRM estimates show that groups who have combined 
incomes over $75,000 are significantly different in terms of “religious morality” compared to groups 
with incomes less than $50,000 (Figure 10). A statistically significant difference is also observable 
between urban and rural populations (Figure 11). On the other hand, we see no statistically 
significant differences across various races (Figure 12) and between genders (Figure 13). In addition, 
all gender and race subgroups are not statistically different from the overall population average (the 
95% confidence intervals of all estimates straddles the overall mean). 
 
Figure 10 
 
Figure 11 
 
Figure 12 
 Figure 13 
Concepts such as religious morality are psycho-social constructs. They are not measurable or even 
observable directly like variables such as income or educational achievement. However, constructs 
such as these provide us with important information that is useful for a wide range of political, social, 
and economic purposes. This makes their measurement an important endeavor. The fact that these 
constructs are challenging to measure, both in terms of logistics and psychometric issues, highlights 
the importance of robust measurement approaches.  
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